ACCOUNTANTS AND RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS: THE CLIENT COMMODITY
Stuart L. Pachman*
"Accounting firm sues employees under noncompete clause."
This headline is not uncommon in a professional journals' because a
restrictive covenant, or noncompetition clause, is often part of an
accountant's employment agreement. 2 A restrictive covenant also may
3
be incorporated into a partnership agreement for an accounting firm
or a shareholders' agreement among accountants practicing in a professional corporation. 4 Are these agreements enforceable? Does public
policy insulate accountants and render void their promises not to
compete? Are restrictive covenants involving accountants more easily
enforceable than those involving other occupations? The answer to the
first question is "yes;" to the second, "no;" and to the third, an
equivocal "it depends."
I. APPLICATION TO PROFESSIONS GENERALLY

Restrictive covenants are not favored creatures of the law. Where
professionals are concerned, additional considerations come into
play.5 Restrictive covenants are unenforceable as to lawyers because
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See, e.g., 4 Pun. ACCOUNTINc REP. 1, 1 (1981). The headline there read, "Alexander
Grant Sues Former Washington Employees Under Non-Compete Clause." Id.
2 In Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463 (Del. Ch. 1977), the proofs showed that
"a substantial number of accounting firms utilize" restrictive covenant agreements. Id. at 468.
3 Hereafter when the term "accounting firm" is used, it is intended to include both a
partnership and a professional corporation of accountants, and, where applicable, a sole practitioner who employs accountants subject to a restrictive covenant agreement. No distinction is
drawn here between the enforcement of a covenant against a former employee and the enforcement of a covenant against a former partner or fellow shareholder. The court in Foti v. Cook,
220 Va. 800, 263 S.E.2d 430 (1980), however, suggested that such a distinction might be drawn
when it noted: "We are not dealing here with employer and employee but with senior partners
who stood upon equal footing at the bargaining table." Id. at 806, 263 S.E.2d at 433.
4 A certified public accountant called as an expert witness in Foti v. Cook, 220 Va. 800, 263
S.E.2d 430 (1980), testified that the covenant in issue was similar to covenants contained in
agreements of other accounting firms. Id. at 807, 263 S.E.2d at 434.
5 See Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson, 183 N.J. Super. 434, 443-44, 444 A.2d
75, 80 (Ch. Div. 1982) (noting fiduciary relationship between accountant and client unlike
relationship between "commercial business people"); Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 347,
336 A.2d 498, 500 (Ch. Div.), aff'd per curiam, 137 N.J. Super. 135, 348 A.2d 208 (App. Div.
1975) (recognizing "consensual, highly fiduciary" relationship between attorney and client); see
also Gant v. Warr, 286 Ala. 387, 389, 240 So. 2d 353, 355-56 (1970) (discussing distinction
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they violate DR 2-108(A), 6 one of the Disciplinary Rules of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. 7 On the other hand, such agreements
have been consistently enforced against physicians 8 despite strong
public policy protests. 9 Courts have repeatedly rejected the argument
that the application of a restrictive covenant to an accountant is void
as against public policy or that it is unreasonable per se.' 0 A Delaware
court refused to extend to accountants the doctrine of Dwyer v.
Jung,"1 which held restrictive covenants unenforceable against lawyers.' 2 It found no rule regulating the conduct of accountants comparable to that of DR 2-108(A).' 3 Moreover, the evidence showed not
only that restrictive covenants are not considered unethical among

between "profession" and "business" in Alabama statutes involving contracts in restraint of
trade).
6 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(A) (1981), provides: "A lawyer
shall not be a party to or participate in a partnership or employment agreement with another
lawyer that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice law after the termination of a relationship
created by the agreement, except as a condition to payment of retirement benefits." Id.
7 Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 347, 336 A.2d 498, 500 (Ch. Div.), afJ'd per curiam,
137 N.J. Super. 135, 348 A.2d 208 (App. Div. 1975). In addition to DR 2-108(A), the trial judge
cited opinions of the New Jersey Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics
and of the New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on Professional Ethics. Id. at 34748, 336 A.2d at 500-01.
8 See, e.g., Bauer v. Sawyer, 8 I11.
2d 351, 134 N.E.2d 329 (1956); Bradford v. Billington,
299 S.W.2d 601 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957); Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1973);
McCallum v. Asbury, 238 Or. 257, 393 P.2d 774 (1964); Daniel v. Goesl, 161 Tex. 490, 341
S.W.2d 892 (1960). See generally Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 970, 992 (1975).
In the leading New Jersey case, Karlin v. Weinberg, 77 N.J. 408, 390 A.2d 1161 (1978), the
majority found that the application of a restrictive covenant to a physician was not unenforceable per se, and held that a physician has a legitimate interest in the protection of patient
relationships, particularly where through "his efforts, expenditures, and reputation, [he] has
developed a significant practice." Id. at 417, 390 A.2d at 1169.
o The three dissenting justices in Karlin v. Weinberg, 77 N.J. 408, 390 A.2d 1161 (1978),
found the relationship between physician and patient "so personal and so sensitive" that anything that interferes with it should be held contrary to public policy. Id. at 426, 390 A.2d at 1170
(Sullivan, J., dissenting).
10 See Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463, 466 (Del. Ch. 1977); Ebbeskotte v.
Tyler, 127 Ind. App. 433, 438, 142 N.E.2d 905, 909 (Ct. App. 1957); Smith, Batchelder & Rugg
v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679, 684, 406 A.2d 1310, 1313 (1979); Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v.
Edelson, 183 N.J. Super. 434, 439, 444 A.2d 75, 78 (Ch. Div. 1982). Although the court in Smith
acknowledged that several other courts had enforced restrictive covenants in the accounting
profession, it noted indications in the record that accountants were not in favor of restrictive
covenants and that the evidence appeared to indicate that the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants was opposed to restrictive covenants "because it believes that the employee is
put at a severe disadvantage." Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679, 684, 406 A.2d
1310, 1313 (1979).
11 133 N.J. Super. 343, 336 A.2d 498 (Ch. Div.), aff'd per curiam, 137 N.J. Super. 135, 348
A.2d 208 (App. Div. 1975).
12 Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463 (Del. Ch. 1977).
" Id. at 467; cf. Karlin v. Weinberg, 148 N.J. Super. 243, 246, 372 A.2d 616, 618-19 (App.
Div. 1977), aJ'd, 77 N.J. 408, 390 A.2d 1161 (1978) (finding no comparable provision regulating
medical profession).
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accountants, but also that a substantial number of accounting firms
14
do, in fact, appear to use them.
II.

APPLICATION TO ACCOUNTANTS SPECIFICALLY

The rules of law which determine the validity of a restrictive
covenant as applied to an accountant are the same as those applied to
other occupations. 1 5 A valid restriction "protects the legitimate interests of the employer, imposes no undue hardship on the employee, and
is not injurious to the public."' 6
A. The Legitimate Interests Entitled to Protection
Courts have uniformly held that the accounting firm as an employer has a legitimate interest, inherent in the very nature of the
practice of the profession, which is entitled to protection through a
restrictive covenant.17 Over fifty years ago a judge in the State of
Washington remarked that often a client's major, if not sole, contact
with an accounting firm is with the employee who is sent to service its
needs.II The court described the personal relationship that a manager
or other accountant employed by a firm develops with the firm's
clients:
Upon the hearing, evidence showed that the business of a certified
public accountant is such that the person who actually performs
the labor incident thereto acquires an intimate knowledge of the
business of the client, preparing audits of the business, income tax
returns, and other matters very confidential in their nature, and
vital to the business itself. . . . [A]s the client learns to know the
accountant, the desire of the client to have the particular accountant do his work increases to the point where it is almost impossible

Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463, 468 (Del. Ch. 1977).
Compare Whitmyer Bros. v. Doyle, 58 N.J. 25, 32-33, 274 A.2d 577, 581 (1971) (employment contract of construction company manager) with Foti v. Cook, 220 Va. 800, 263 S.E.2d
430 (1980) and Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679, 683, 406 A.2d 1310, 1312
(1979) (cases involving accountants' employment contracts); see also Mailman, Ross, Toyes &
Shapiro v. Edelson, 183 N.J. Super. 434, 444 A.2d 75 (Ch. Div. 1982).
"I Solari Indus. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 576, 264 A.2d 53, 56 (1970). The court in Solari
established this as the general test of the validity of covenants not to compete. The court held that
it was "entirely satisfied that the time is well due for the abandonment of ... [the] void per se
rule in favor of a rule which permits the total or partial enforcement of non-competitive
agreements to the extent reasonable under the circumstances." Id. at 585, 264 A.2d at 61.
17 Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463 (Del. Ch. 1977); Ebbeskotte v. Tyler,
127
Ind. App. 433, 142 N.E.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1957); Scott v. Gillis, 197 N.C. 223, 148 S.E. 315
(1929); Racine v. Bender, 141 Wash. 606, 252 P. 115 (1927).
IS Racine v. Bender, 141 Wash. 606, 608, 252 P. 115, 116 (1927).
15
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to change the accountant, owing to the confidential knowledge he
has of all the important and vital matters concerning the business ...."I
Two years later, on the other side of the continent, another court
held that because an accountant had become so intimately associated
with his employer's clients, it saw "no reason why in good conscience
a court of equity would not enjoin him from a breach of his contract ' '20 not to solicit or accept any business for three years from any
other client for whom he had performed services while in the employ
of plaintiff. 2 1 In expressing the rationale for its decision, the court
quoted a now rather dated source whose teaching, nevertheless, is still
valid:
"Few professional men would take assistants and intrust them with
their business, impart to them their knowledge and skill, bring
them in contact with their clients and patients, unless they were
assured that the knowledge and skill imparted and the friendships
and associations formed would not be used, when the services were
ended, to appropriate the very business
such assistants were em22
ployed to maintain and enlarge."
Cases in this area have held that the accounting firm has a
legitimate interest in its relationships with its clients, and that these
relationships are to be protected from a manager or other employee
who has the opportunity to form professional and personal relationships with the firm's clients and to gain knowledge of their business
and procedures which would otherwise be confidential.2 3 Even when
the court is not favorably disposed toward the restrictive covenant,
the legitimate business interest in an employer's "ongoing professional
relationships with its clients" 24 is recognized. In one case, the court
noted that although clients' records are returned to them upon request, information established by an accounting firm about clients
and audit programs is considered confidential, and a new auditor
might need a period of six weeks to gain familiarity with the affairs of
a client. 25 This "legitimate interest" of the accounting firm is to be
11Id.,
20

252 P. at 115-16.
Scott v. Gillis, 197 N.C. 223, 227, 148 S.E. 315, 317 (1929).

21 Id.

Id. (quoting 6 RULING CASE LAW (CONTRACTS) § 206, at 805 (1929)).
Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463 (Del. Ch. 1977); see also Rhoads v. Clifton,
Gunderson & Co., 89 I11.
App. 3d 751, 411 N.E.2d 1380 (App. Ct. 1980).
24 Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson, 183 N.J. Super. 434, 439, 444 A.2d 75, 78
(Ch. Div. 1982).
11 Wolf & Co. v. Waldron, 51 111. App. 3d 239, 242, 366 N.E.2d 603, 605 (App. Ct. 1977).
In Racine v. Bender, 141 Wash. 606, 252 P. 115 (1927), some of the clients testified that they
22
23
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protected not only from terminated employees but also from withdrawing partners and fellow shareholders. 26
B. Enforcement
In deciding the effect of restrictive covenants in an accountant's
employment contract, courts look to such traditional interests as the
covenant's scope, geographic breadth, and duration. 27 A Delaware
court, for example, enjoined an accountant from practicing public
accounting in competition with his former employer for a fixed period
of time in the Delmarva Peninsula. 28 The court held that the geoasked the defendant accountant to do their work. Id. at 612, 252 P. at 117. The court pointed
out: "They do not desire his services because he is the only person who has the ability to perform
them, but because they know him well, and he knows all about their business." Id. But see
Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson, 183 N.J. Super. 434, 444 A.2d 75 (Ch. Div. 1982),
in which the court noted:
It would not be reasonable .. .to preclude those of plaintiff's present clients from
unilaterally exercising their free choice, first to leave plaintiff, and then to seek to
continue a confidential business relationship with defendant-even though he is no
longer associated with plaintiff firm. Nor would it be reasonable to bar plaintiffs
former clients from independently seeking out defendant's services. The client's
rights to select the custodians of their financial affairs is paramount, and may not be
unreasonably encumbered.
Id. at 444, 444 A.2d at 80.
26 In addition to finding that information gathered during previous audits concerning the
various businesses of the clients of the firm to be a valuable asset, the court in Foti v. Cook, 220
Va. 800, 263 S.E.2d 430 (1980), recognized that a withdrawing partner would know which
clients paid large fees and how promptly they paid. Id. at 805, 263 S.E.2d at 433; see also
Rhoads v. Clifton, Gunderson & Co., 89 Ill. App. 3d 751, 411 N.E.2d 1380 (App. Ct. 1980).
27 Some accountants' employment contracts contain a restrictive covenant that forbids the
accountant from working for his former employer's clients for a stated period of time. E.g.,
LaPorte v. Bott, 173 N.J. Super. 590, 592, 414 A.2d 1363, 1364 (App. Div. 1980) (accountant
agreement not to solicit clients for five year period without written consent of former partner's
estate). Although there is no hard and fast rule concerning the validity of the durational factor, it
appears that the courts will enforce such a requirement as long as the time constraints are
reasonable. See, e.g., Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d at 465. In Faw, the accountant's employment contract contained both a covenant not to compete within a certain geographical area, see infra note 28, and a covenant not to compete for a period of two years. 375 A.2d at
465. The Delaware court based its decision to enforce the agreement on the validity of the
geographical limitations, id. at 468-69, and did not discuss the issue of the durational limitation
contained in the restrictive covenant. It can be inferred, though, that the two year time
restriction was acceptable to the court.
Similarly, in Schultz v. Ingram, 38 N.C. App. 422, 248 S.E.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1978), the
accountant was prohibited from practicing within a certain area for a period of two years. Id. at
425, 248 S.E.2d at 347. The court held that the time restriction was not unreasonable "in view of
the nature of the plaintiff's business, because confidential information given to the defendant is
viable for that period of time." Id. at 430, 248 S.E.2d at 350.
28 Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463 (Del. Ch. 1977). The peninsula
encompasses virtually all of the State of Delaware, as well as the eastern shores of Maryland and
Virginia. Id. at 468.
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graphical scope of the restriction was not overly broad when the
plaintiff showed that it maintained offices and had the capability to
29
service clients throughout the restricted area.
The nature of the restriction should be more important than its
geographical coverage. 30 To this end, some courts will enforce a covenant seeking only to limit the "taking" of the firm's clients. 31 In a
leading Indiana decision the court enforced a restrictive covenant
against an accountant which sought only to prevent her from soliciting and accepting employment from her former firm's clients; 32 it did
not bar her from practicing in any geographical area. In another case
33
the former employee did not deny that he had violated the covenant,
but argued that because it contained no geographical limits, the covenant was overly broad. The court was not persuaded. It stressed
instead that the restriction was limited to protecting the plaintiff from
losing its clients. 34 Since its clients were doing business on a nationwide basis, and since the plaintiff firm had numerous offices throughout the United States, the court held that a geographical limitation
would serve no purpose.3 5 The former employee could practice accounting in any geographical area, but would be prohibited from
36
contact with clients and former clients of the plaintiff firm.
Other courts, however, stress the importance of geographical
limits, and will not enforce a covenant without one. 37 In Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Sharp,38 the court held unenforceable,

29 Id.; see also Schultz v. Ingram, 38 N.C. App. 422, 248 S.E.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1978), in
which an accounts payable auditor was enjoined from competing with his former employer in six
southern states for a period of two years.
31 For a discussion concerning the nature of interests protected by a restrictive covenant and
geographical limitations, see Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson, 183 N.J. Super. 435,
441-43, 444 A.2d 75, 78-79 (Ch. Div. 1982).
31 Wolf & Co. v. Waldron, 51111. App. 3d 239, 366 N.E.2d 603 (App. Ct. 1977); Ebbeskotte
v. Tyler, 127 Ind. App. 433, 142 N.E.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1957); Scott v. Gillis, 197 N.C. 223, 148
S.E. 315 (1929); Racine v. Bender, 141 Wash. 606, 252 P. 115 (1927); see also Fuller v. Kolb, 238
Ga. 602, 605, 234 S.E.2d 517, 518 (1977) (Jordan, J., dissenting).
32 Ebbeskotte v. Tyler, 127 Ind. App. 433, 434, 142 N.E.2d 905, 906 (Ct. App. 1957).
13 Wolf & Co. v. Waldron, 51 111. App. 3d 239, 242, 366 N.E.2d 603, 605 (App. Ct. 1977).
He had taken the files of 27 clients. Two of the accounts lost by the employer to the former
employee had been serviced by it for 30 years and 10 years respectively. Id. Since his separation
from the employer, the employee had obtained fees of $14,000 and $18,000 from those two
accounts. Id.
3 id.
1s Id. at 242, 366 N.E.2d at 606.
36 Id., 366 N.E.2d at 605; accord Foti v. Cook, 220 Va. 800, 263 S.E.2d 430 (1980).
31 E.g., Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679, 406 A.2d 1310 (1979).
' 585 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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with substantial adverse consequence to the firm, a restrictive covenant against a former partner that did not specify a reasonable geographical area.3 9 Stressing the absence of a space limitation may
simply be the "peg" on which a court will "hang its hat" in order to
hold unenforceable an otherwise valid covenant. This may be gleaned
40
by comparing the majority and dissenting opinions in Fuller v. Kolb.
Despite the fact that the nature of the restriction sought was reasonable, the Fuller court held it void by primarily relying on the fact that
the covenant had no territorial limits. 4' Justice Jordan, in his dissent,
expressed the view that territorial limits were of no moment. 42 He
stressed that in its agreement plaintiff had only asked the defendant to
"'leave our clients alone ' ' 43 for a period of two years. As such, he said,
the restriction could not be more reasonable in protecting the legitimate interests of the employer and in imposing no undue hardship on
44
the employee.
In determining whether to enforce a restrictive covenant in this
area, courts exercise the same caution as is exercised in deciding
similar questions involving employees or associates of other professions, trades, or businesses. Judges are hesitant to restrain an accountant from practicing his chosen profession.
This reluctance is illustrated in a decision of the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire. 45 There, the defendants withdrew from plaintiff
accounting firm and formed their own firm in violation of written
employment contracts containing covenants not to compete. 46 Although ruling that accountants are not immune from enforcement of
their restrictive covenants, the court nevertheless articulated three
reasons in support of its decision not to enforce the covenants. First,
the covenants were deemed to be too broad geographically. 47 Second,
it was held that their coverage was over-extensive because the restric" Id. at 908; accord Fuller v. Kolb, 238 Ga. 602, 234 S.E.2d 517 (1977); Mailman, Ross,
Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson, 183 N.J. Super. 434, 443, 444 A.2d 75, 79 (Ch. Div. 1982).
40 238 Ga. 602, 234 S.E.2d 517 (1977). Fuller was followed by the Georgia court in Heller v.
Magaro, 148 Ga. App. 591, 252 S.E.2d 11 (Ct. App. 1978).
1' 238 Ga. at 603, 234 S.E.2d at 518.
42 Id. at 605, 234 S.E.2d at 518 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
41 Id., 234 S.E.2d at 519 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
44

Id.

Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679, 406 A.2d 1310 (1979).
Id. at 681, 406 A.2d at 1311.
41 The covenant in question, similar to the one in Wolf & Co. v. Waldron, 51 111, App. 3d
239, 366 N.E. 2d 603 (App. Ct. 1977), contained no geographical limitation. The master, who
heard the case below, held that in the absence of a provision limiting the covenant geographically, the States of New Hampshire and Vermont would be established as the area covered. He
went on to find that that area was "unreasonably large." Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster,
119 N.H. 679, 683, 406 A.2d 1310, 1312 (1979).
45
46
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tions applied not only to current clients, but also to former clients who
had been served by the plaintiff during its existence.4 8
The third reason given by the court, which may be described as
"the comparative hardship test," is the one which is noteworthy. The
court found that the plaintiff firm enjoyed a relationship with 3000
clients from whom it received over $2 million in earnings. 4 It compared this with the fact that the new firm formed by the defendants
had earned gross fees of less than $48,000 in 7.5 months from only 207
clients and that only 40 of the 207 had been former clients of the
plaintiff, and none of the clients had been "actively solicited" by the
defendants. 50 The court reasoned that the hardship incurred by the
plaintiff in losing 40 clients, as compared with the hardship which
5
would be suffered by the defendants if compelled by the court to pay 1
for those 40 clients, was too disproportionate to permit the covenant
to be enforced.
III.

52

TOWARD A

MORE

APPROPRIATE AND ENFORCEABLE COVENANT

To give greater assurance to an accounting firm that its restrictive covenant agreement will be enforced, and to overcome the concern that damages resulting from breach could be hard to measure,
the following is suggested.
First, the covenant should be limited in its coverage. The former
employee should be restricted only from servicing clients of the employer. As such, "clients" must be defined. The term may be limited to
those with whom the employee came in contact while employed, or
might be expanded to include any clients of the employer during the
period of employment. Other variations include whether the restrictions should apply only to those clients whom the firm was serving on
the date the employee leaves, or former clients whom the firm had
serviced within a reasonably fixed period of time (one, two, or three
years) prior to the termination of employment. The precise terms of

48 For another decision stressing overbreadth, see Howard Schultz & Assoc. v. Broniec, 239
Ga. 181, 236 S.E.2d 265 (1977).
49 Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679, 684, 406 A.2d 1310, 1312 (1979).
50 Id.

11 For a discussion of the methods of computing payments for clients, see injra text accompanying notes 54-68.
52 Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679, 684, 406 A.2d 1310, 1313 (1979). The
comparative hardship argument was not always successful. For example, the court was unpersuaded where a physician, seeking to avoid a restrictive covenant, contended that the plaintiffs
practice would still be exceedingly large even if the plaintiff lost patients to him. Marvel v.
Jonah, 83 N.J. Eq. 295, 90 A. 1004 (1914).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:312

the restriction will vary depending upon the size and concerns of the
53
employer and the relative bargaining position of the parties.
Second, in addition to a clause prohibiting the employee from
"taking" clients and the employee's acknowledgement that the promise not to "take" may be enforced in equity, the agreement should
provide, as an alternative to injunctive relief, that should the employee breach the covenant, he will pay damages measured by the
value of the clients taken.
The "good will" cases first demonstrated that such damages may
be accurately determined. Traditionally, there was a philosophical, if
not practical, dispute as to whether good will should be attributed to
an accounting firm or to the individual accountants who comprised
the firm. Two leading cases reached opposite results. In Cook v.
Lauten,5 4 the court adhered to the traditional rule that the reputation
of a professional partnership depends upon the individual skill of the
partners. The partnership was determined to have no good will5 5 to be
distributed as a firm asset on dissolution. In Evans v. Gunnip,5 the
court reached the opposite conclusion. When Evans withdrew from
the partnership and claimed his share of the firm's good will, Gunnip
argued that good will belonged to the individual partners and was not
a partnership asset subject to distribution. 57 The court rejected Cook
and ruled that good will adhered to the partnership. 58 This was
demonstrated by the fact that most of the accounts were recurring,
that the information contained in the files was valuable, and the
accounts of a retiring partner remained with the partnership. 59
Accountants, who value their clients in more than one sense of
the word, have long acknowledged that an accounting practice has a
value that exceeds its physical assets of furniture and equipment. It is

53 Drafting should be done with care. For example, where an accountant claimed he was not
violating the covenant because he had not solicited the clients, the court was quick to point out
that that made no difference since he had agreed to neither solicit nor service for a five year
period. LaPorte v. Bott, 173 N.J. Super. 590, 595-96, 414 A.2d 1363, 1365 (App. Div. 1980). But
see Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson, 183 N.J. Super. 434, 444, 444 A.2d 75, 80 (Ch.
Div. 1982) (recognizing "client's right to select the custodians of their financial affairs").
54 1 111. App. 2d 255, 117 N.E.2d 414 (App. Ct. 1954).
55 Id. at 259, 117 N.E.2d at 416; see also Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 281, 415 P.2d 667
(1966).
11 36 Del. Ch. 589, 135 A.2d 128 (Ch. 1957).
57 Id. at 592, 135 A.2d at 130-31.
"8 Id., 135 A.2d at 131.
59 Id.

1983]

ACCOUNTANTS' RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

321

not unusual for all or a portion of an accounting practice to be bought
or sold.60 A Virginia decision candidly recognizes that this practice
exists,"' and a New Jersey decision demonstrates that the practice is
entitled to judicial protection.6 2 The. purchase price reflects the value
of the clients involved, which is often expressed as a multiple or
63
percentage of the annual billings generated by those clients.
To assist a court in measuring damages, a restrictive covenant
should contain an agreed value or an agreed formula for measuring
the value, or price, of clients "taken" in violation of the restriction. In
other words, the covenant should provide that if the covenantee,
whether a former employee, partner, or shareholder, leaves the firm
and opens his or her own practice or joins with others, he or she will
pay for those clients lost to the firm and gained by the former associate
just as if those clients had been purchased. The agreement not only
should provide the agreed "purchase price" as the measure of damages, but also the terms on which that price is to be paid.
Foti v. Cook 64 illustrates that this type of covenant is both workable and enforceable. Foti, who was a partner in the Andrews firm,
withdrew from the firm and joined another.6 5 The Andrews' partnership agreement recognized that the clients belonged to the firm and
not to the individual partners.66 As part of that agreement, Foti, and
each other partner, promised that during the twenty-four months
60 See George William Hoffman & Co. v. Capital Servs. Co.,
101 Ill. App. 3d 487, 428
N.E.2d 600 (App. Ct. 1981). A lawyer's clients, however, "may not be offered for sale. " Dwyer,
133 N.J. Super. at 346, 336 A.2d at 499.
61 Foti v. Cook, 220 Va. 800, 807, 263 S.E.2d 430, 434 (1980).
62 LaPorte v. Bott, 173 N.J. Super. 590, 414 A.2d 1363 (App. Div. 1980). LaPorte and Bott

had been partners practicing accounting. Id. at 591, 414 A.2d at 1363. When LaPorte died, the
clients of the partnership devolved upon his estate pursuant to the agreement under which the
partnership was dissolved. Id. at 592, 414 A.2d at 1363. Bott became a partner in H&C, another
accounting firm, and LaPorte's estate sold the clients to H&C. Id., 414 A.2d at 1364. The price
to be paid by H&C was a 15% commission on all sums collected by H&C from those clients over
a period of five years. Id. Bott had agreed with LaPorte's estate not to solicit those clients for the
same five year period without the consent of the estate or H&C. Id. Because not all of the
agreements were before the trial court, the matter had to be remanded. The appellate division,
however, held that the estate had an interest in receiving the price for which it had sold the
clients to H&C, and this interest should be protected by allowing it to recover damages from Bott
for violating the restrictive covenant. Id. at 593-94, 414 A.2d at 1364-65.
63 George William Hoffman & Co. v. Capital Servs. Co., 101 I11.App. 3d 487, 428 N.E.2d
600 (App. Ct. 1981). In Foti v. Cook, 220 Va. 800, 263 S.E.2d 430 (1980), a certified public
accountant, testifying as an expert witness described "the custom in the accounting profession for
firms to buy the practices of other individual accountants or accounting firms and that payment
is customarily based upon the fees or business of the selling accountant." Id. at 807, 263 S.E.2d at
434.
61 220 Va. 800, 263 S.E.2d 430 (1980).
65 Id. at 801-02, 263 S.E.2d at 431.
66 Id. at 802, 263 S.E.2d at 431.
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immediately following withdrawal, none would offer to perform or
67
would perform accounting services for any client of the partnership.
The agreement also provided that if the promise were breached, the
former partner would, for a period of three years, pay to the partnership an amount equal to one-third of each year's fees collected from
68
each client taken from the partnership.
The Foti court had no difficulty enforcing the covenant and held
Foti liable to his former firm for the sum of $40,264.31. 89 Foti had
argued that the covenant should not be applied because another member of his new firm, rather than he, was performing the accounting
services for the clients who were formerly Andrews' . 70 The court held
that to adopt such an interpretation would render the covenant mean7
ingless. 1
CONCLUSION

The rules of the law that surround restrictive covenants strive to
achieve a balance between the rights and duties of contending interests. By restricting the accountant covenantee from rendering professional services to clients of his or her former firm, the court is within
the ambit of the traditional rules of restrictive covenant law although
there may be some adverse effect on the public; that is, those clients
who would prefer to enjoy the continued services of the accountant
leaving the firm. 72 That effect, however, is avoided or lessened if
instead of granting injunctive relief, the court requires the former
employee or partner to pay for the clients "taken." By providing the
purchase price and terms in the agreement, the court's task is made
easier and the likelihood of enforcement is enhanced. Thus, the legitimate interest of the employer is protected without imposing undue
hardship on the employee or being overly injurious to the public.

67
s

Id.
The agreed value of a client was one times one year's billings. id. If a withdrawing partner

"took" a client, he was to pay the firm the value or price of that client over a period of three
years. Id. at 802 n.1, 263 S.E.2d at 431 n.1. In Foti, the price to be paid pursuant to the
agreement was based upon the withdrawing partner's collections. Id. at 802, 263 S.E.2d at 431.
Other ways by which "the purchase price" may be measured are the withdrawing partner's
billings to the client, or the former firm's billings during the last year or years it rendered services
to the client.
-9 Id. at 804, 807, 263 S.E.2d at 432, 434.
70 Id. at 807, 263 S.E.2d at 434.
71 Id.
72 Compare Rhoads

v. Clifton, Gunderson & Co., 89 I11. App. 3d 751, 411 N.E.2d 1380

(App. Ct. 1980), with Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson, 183 N.J. Super. 434, 444
A.2d 75 (Ch. Div. 1982). See supra note 25 discussing the conflicting considerations that courts
must weigh.

